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Most of the works that have been published on the
post-Saddam political system deal with the role of US
in the process of state building efforts and peace
implementation in post-Saddam politics. However,
the contribution of the domestic political elites in this
transitional period of democratic consolidation has
been, to a large extent, neglected by scholars in general
and those in political science, in particular. Yet, there
exists a considerable scholarly literature examining the
functioning of the political system in the post-Saddam
era. These can be divided into three categories:
1) Works dealing with the role of the US;
2) Studies dealing with the country’s constitutional
arrangements and the nature of the political system,
its advantages and disadvantages;
3) Literature dealing with applicability of different
forms of power-sharing arrangements such as
federalism, consociational and integrative ap-
proaches.
THE ROLE OF THE US:
Works related to the role of the U.S. in establish-
ing and making the Iraqi political system functions
properly are quite numerous. Liam Anderson and
Gareth Stanfield survey a broader field, the overall
future of Iraq and what is most more likely to become
of its “democracy dilemma,” that is the magnitude of
the task confronting the United States of America in
post-Saddam Iraq (Stanfield, 2004). They clearly
conclude that a managed partition by the U.S. and
therefore independence for the Kurds is the least
worse option: “on balance, an independent Kurdistan
resolves more problems than it creates.” (Stanfield,
2004, p. 217) However, they are pessimistic about the
ability of United States to achieve its stated goal of
democratizing Iraq while preserving its territorial
integrity as a state, (Stanfield, 2004, p. 224) for several
reasons. In the first place, they note that “at the most
fundamental level, democracy requires the existence of
an implicit consensus on the legitimacy of the underly-
ing order. It is questionable whether the Kurds have
ever fully accepted the legitimacy of an Iraqi state that
includes them within its borders. Second, any form of
democracy requires trust, which has been pitifully
absent in Iraq” (Stanfield, 2004, p. 10).  Iraq “was an
artificial British creation,” (Stanfield, 2004, p. 186)
which has only been able to be held together by the
glue of authoritarianism. (Stanfield, 2004, p. 198) The
minimum requirement for the successful reintegration
of the Kurds into the state of Iraq is, therefore, a post-
Saddam political order characterized by pluralism,
cultural tolerance, and a high degree of regional
autonomy, precisely the sort of government that Iraq
has never enjoyed. Moreover, the fact that Iraqi
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Kurdistan (in effect) has been independent since 1991
and operating separately from Baghdad has, in fact,
created structural problems that would make it
painful for Kurdistan to return to its pre-1991 posi-
tion (Stanfield, 2004, p. 114). This split in the
administration arrangement of the Iraqi state is
arguably the most significant event in the country’s
modern history. Furthermore, democracy in Iraq
would most likely result as it did, in majority Shi’a
rule, which would not only overturn Sunni rule of
Iraq since the creation of the state in the 1920s, but
be a reversal of the historic Sunni victory during
Islam’s first century. As the current insurgency demon-
strates, the Sunnis will not easily submit to Shi’a rule.
After weighing this myriad of obstacles to a unified
and democratic Iraq, Anderson and Stanfield con-
clude that the least worst outcome would be a man-
aged partition in which the Kurds secede while the
remaining Arab-populated units stay together
(Stanfield, 2004, p. 216). Leslie Gelb and Peter
Galbraith agree with Anderson and Stanfield and
argued further that Iraq has “three distinct and sectar-
ian communities,” Sunni, Shia, and Kurd (Gelb L. H.,
2004) (Galbraith, 2004). These communities, it is
claimed, are largely geographically homogeneous and
mutually hostile. They have been locked in an artifi-
cial, Sunni-dominated state for eighty-five years. This
analysis leads its promoters to view the post-Saddam
politics as tragic but that tragedy is largely unavoid-
able. This approach asserts that Iraqi politics has
always been and will continue to be animated by
deeply held communal antipathies. From this perspec-
tive, there can only be one policy option for the
United States: the situation will be stabilized by
dividing the country into three smaller, ethnically
purer and more manageable units. There is a possibil-
ity that this could be done through a form of drastic
decentralization, as proposed by U.S. senator Joseph
R. Biden and Leslie Gelb. But this position argued
consistently for its complete division into separate
states (Gelb, 1 May 2006). However, Gelb and
Galbraith argument of simply dividing Iraq into three
ethnically purer states misses the main characteristic of
post-Saddam politics, which is the lack of institutional
and coercive state capacity in Iraq. The radical decen-
tralization of political power runs the distinct danger
of devolving the violent struggle for supremacy. As
Toby Dodge argued, this could localize the conflict
among Shia groups and between the two main
Kurdish political parties (KDP_PUK) (Toby Dodge,
State Collapse and the Rise of Identity Politics in
(Rowsweel, 2007)). What Iraq desperately needs is one
coherent and functioning state, not three. Its govern-
ing institutions, bureaucratic, military, and political,
must be rebuilt from the ground up across the territo-
rial extent of the country (Rowsweel, 2007).  More-
over, to make inroads Dodge argued that, the United
States, the United Nations and the European Union
need to present the Iraqi government with specific
demands for good governance and reduction of the
scope for corruption, patronage, and abuse in return
for further aid and assistance (Rowsweel, 2007, p. 35).
Therefore, the growth of stable state institutions, with
a meaningful presence in people’s lives, forms the
framework within which the longer-term goal of
successful state building, the reconstruction of an Iraqi
nation, can be achieved (Rowsweel, 2007). Yahia Said
agrees with Dodge and is very critical of U.S. policy in
Iraq. He argues that the US-led coalition came to Iraq
with a superficial groupist, preimordialists,  atavistic
reading of the country, one which downplayed the
crosscutting ties that bound Iraqis together. The
coalition provided an advantage to sectarian and
ethnocentric leaders, and the descent into civil war
began. These leaders then negotiated a sectarian and
unfair constitution, which has further polarized
matters (Said, 2006). Said accordingly, stresses the
commonalities that Iraqis share and argue for nation
building. He calls for a strong, centralized, and ethni-
cally impartial Iraqi state. The Center for Arab Unity
Studies (seated in Beirut, Lebanon) had already
organized a major Seminar about the Occupation of
Iraq and its repercussions on the Arab, Regional and
International Scenes during 8-11 March 2004. Before,
in the course and after that seminar, eight books (in
Arabic) (Haseeb K. E.-D., 2004) (The Centre of Arab
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Unity Studies, 2004) (The Centre of Arab Unity,
2004) (Haseeb K. E.-D., 2006) were published by the
Center on the same subject since the occupation of
Baghdad (www.caus.org). In addition, about twenty-
five issues of its monthly journal concentrated a big
deal on the same subject. The Center regards the
occupation of Iraq as apart of an American plan to
redraw the map of the region with only the American
objectives in view (www.caus.org). Therefore, what
happens in Iraq influences, and will continue to
influence, not only Iraq, but also the entire Arab
region; indeed it will even have critical consequences
and repercussions for the regional and international
scenes. Whereas the Center is convinced that the
occupation of Iraq will give rise to Arab, regional, and
international turbulence and instability that will
influence, positively or negatively, for a long term of
time, the future of the Arab nation, therefore, the
Center feels strongly, that it is obliged, as a matter of
priority, to devote to the subject the energy and efforts
it deserves.
ON POWER SHARING
John McGarry is one of the rare scholars who have
tried to apply the theory of consociational democracy
to the Iraqi political system in the post-Saddam era
(McGarry). He discusses the impact of the theoretical
debate on democratization in Iraq. He points to the
general position that democratization requires more
than merely free and fair elections and as such, the
primary task for outsiders is to work with Iraq’s
democratically elected politicians and to support the
internally negotiated constitution, while recommend-
ing and offering advice on constructive changes within
the process for constitutional amendments, in order
to create sustainable democratic development.
McGarry discusses two dominant approaches which
have been offered for stopping Iraq’s conflict and
consolidating a democratic system there. The first
approach is represented by the Integrationists who see
post-Saddam Iraq as based on sectarian and ethnocen-
trism, usually seen as of recent origin, rather than
rooted in age-old hatreds. They also stress the com-
monalities that Iraqis share; therefore, they call for a
strong, centralised and ethnically impartial Iraqi state
(McGarry, p. 169). McGrry argued in favour of the
second approach which focuses on the accommoda-
tion of Iraq’s different communities (It is
Consociationalism), simply because Iraq’s new consti-
tution is consistent with consociationalism (McGarry,
p. 170). Therefore, he argued that the outsiders
should work with Iraq’s democratically elected politi-
cians and support the internally negotiated constitu-
tion, while recommending and offering advice on
constructive changes within the process for constitu-
tional amendments, in order to create sustainable
democratic development (McGarry, p. 184). Apart
from that he further suggests that the international
community should assist in building the “capacity” of
regional (and governorate) government, and not just
the capacity of the federal government, as integration-
ists recommend (McGarry).
Noah Feldman, a legal scholar and expert on
constitutional law at New York University, served as
Senior Constitutional Advisor to the CPA in Baghdad
in 2003. From his high-level advisory position and
through his public commentary since leaving Baghdad,
Feldman has exerted a significant sway in the debate
over Iraq’s future.  Most important among his public
recommendations is his book What We Owe Iraq, in
which he explores the ethical dilemmas of the  occupa-
tion  as well  as  his  experience with  the CPA  and
what  he  believes  is  the  best way forward for the
United States in Iraq (Fieldman, 2004). With regard
to leaving behind a lasting democracy, Feldman casts
the problem as a need to convince Iraq’s Sunnis,
specifically the insurgency, that it is in their best
interests to lay down their arms and  join  the Shi‘a
and Kurds  in a power-sharing arrangement. For him,
this task is not simply a propaganda campaign; rather,
it is necessary because it reflects reality. Because he
asserts that “no power association in the country
could reasonably believe that it alone would be  able
to  govern  the  country  and  dominate  everybody
else.” (Fieldman, 2004, p. 47) He believes that “de-
mocracy, then, was not merely the best political
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arrangement that could work in contemporary Iraq.
Once it was realized that no single player could create
an effective tyranny, democracy was also the only
option other than chaos.”
Following Saddam Hussein’s ouster, he says, the
Sunnis believed that they may still have had a chance
of  sabotaging  the effort  to establish constitutional
democracy, and  that  they may still  have  been  able
to  regain  some  semblance  of  their  formerly  domi-
nant  position  in  the  old regime. In  the  formal
terms  favored  by  the  game  theorists who model
democratization,  some nontrivial  number  of  Sunnis
seemed  to  believe  that  the  summed  costs  and
benefits  to them  of  subverting  the  emergence  of  a
democratic  government  in  Iraq  outweighed  the
costs  and  benefits  of  entering  into  a  democratic
state  in which  they  feared  becoming permanent
losers (Fieldman, 2004, p. 43). In saying this,
Feldman does not mean that the Sunnis believed they
had any realistic hope of reasserting the kind of
dominance they enjoyed with Saddam in power.
Rather, he claims  that they  feared  that  their weak
demographic  situation  in  relation  to  the Shi‘a and
Kurds, who had suffered mightily under the Sunni
Ba‘athist regime, would spell disaster for them in a
democratic government.  Therefore, both in order to
avoid retribution and in order to retain as much of
their former privileges as possible, they chose to fight
the formation of a democratic system. The  strategies
of  the  Sunni  insurgent  groups,  as  Feldman  de-
scribes,  varied,  but  they shared two goals: to stall the
establishment of constitutional democracy as long as
possible, and to signal  their willingness  to resist
oppression. The most prevalent strategy to achieve the
first goal, according to Feldman, was the following: by
killing Iraqi police and disrupting the possibilities of
transition, the insurgents might be able to delay the
emergence of a state with the power to enforce the
laws.  They could delay that process long enough for
the United States to run out of patience and decide it
was too costly to remain as an occupier. This scenario
would also result in eventual American withdrawal,
opening the door for the Sunnis to reassert control
(Fieldman, 2004). Feldman adds, “some Sunnis even
believed that long-term anarchy would be preferable to
living under Shi‘i domination. (Fieldman, 2004)”
Feldman writes, “One reason for the Sunni insurgency
during the occupation was that Sunnis wanted to
convince the Shi‘a and the Kurds that oppressing
them simply denying them a full share of state re-
sources would be very costly. (Fieldman, 2004, p.
44)”
Seeing  the  conflict  in  Iraq  through  this  ratio-
nalist  lens,  the  solution  to  the  problem appears
simple—to convince  the parties  involved  that democ-
racy and sharing power  is  in  their best  interests.
For  Feldman,  the  most  important  actors  that
need  convincing  are  the  Sunni insurgents: the  great
challenge  for  an  elected  Iraqi  government  in
which  Shi‘is  are  the  most numerous will be to
assure Iraq’s Sunnis that they will not be treated as
they treated the Shi‘a and the Kurds.  To draw again
on the game theorists, the Shi‘a and the Kurds must
convince the overwhelming majority of Sunnis that
their interests will be better served in a democratic
government in which power will alternate than by
continuing the insurgency to the point of civil war
(Fieldman, 2004). While this solution seems simple,
it is not.  Reassuring a chronically insecure group that
it has nothing to fear takes more than words—it
requires guarantees.  Feldman writes  that  the hardest
part  “will  be  to  create  institutions  that will  give
Sunnis  a  reasonable  hope  of  garnering  a  fair share
of  the spoils of electoral victory. (Fieldman, 2004,
pp. 48-49)” He does not define what he means by a
“fair share”, but we  can  assume  that he  intends  for
Sunnis  to  feel  comfortable  that  their voices will
not be silenced  by  the  Shi‘a majority. This  implies
institutions  that  give  Sunnis  some  sort  of  veto
power,  and  also  possible  power-sharing  arrange-
ments  that  will  guarantee  them  a  role  in  the
country’s  government. In this way, the Sunnis will see
that joining the Kurds and Shi‘a in a democratic
union will be preferable to incurring the high costs of
a continuing insurgency.
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ON CONSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS
A number of books and articles have been written
with a primary concern of how to address the current
ethnic conflict in Iraq and democratic transition of
the country. Many of them are very pessimistic about
such transition. Andres Schedler notes that “regime
transition”…does not lead inevitably to democratic
government. They represent risky journeys from
authoritarianism “towards an uncertain something
else” (Schedler, 2001). Even in the most favorable of
circumstances, regime change is a decidedly hazardous
undertaking and Iraq seems devoid of the most basic
requirements for democracy, whatever view point is
taken (Schedler, 2001). Therefore, as Dawisha argued
democracy seems to be somewhat difficult to intro-
duce into multi-ethnic-sectarian states emerging from
the shadow of authoritarianism even in the best of
circumstances (Dawisha, 2004). Andreas Wimmer
ominously contends that ‘the seeds of democracy may
have difficulties to germinate in the sandy soils of Iraq’
(Wimmer, 2003). He identified two contributing
factors to that as follows: first, democracy is a govern-
ment for the people and by the people, but Iraq was
ethnically too heterogeneous to allow an obvious
answer to the question ‘who is the people? Secondly,
and more importantly, no strong networks of civil
society organizations have developed prior to democra-
tization and introduction of the modern nation state
(Wimmer, 2003, p. 113).   Therefore, as he argued an
important condition for consciationalism is missing.
‘The centripetal drive will have to come from the
outside’, he argued , suggesting structural approaches
to moderate ethnic claims and to have political
positions converge at the center. Wimmer suggested a
model similar to Nigeria’s, where the most powerful
official is elected not only by the majority of the
population but also by a majority of states/ regions in
the country; he also recommended the alternative-vote
electoral system that requires parties to have branches
in a minimum of provinces (Wimmer, 2003, pp. 111-
127). Meaning that a model- with electoral incentives
for parties to appeal across ethnic or sectarian lines,
devolution of power on territorial lines, and the
establishment of a federal structure.
Khair El-Din Haseeb is one of the leading experts
on Iraq and he has written extensively on Iraqi politi-
cal system in post-Saddam Iraq. One of his edited
books which deserves our attention addresses what
was not previously addressed; namely Iraq’s future and
how it is being dealt with by Iraqi elites, which
consisted of 108 scholars, all Iraqi of different disci-
plines of knowledge; the majority of them (66) live
inside Iraq, the others outside of their homeland but
in constant touch with Iraq’s and Iraqi concerns,
particularly those resulting from foreign occupation
(Haseeb, 2006). Being a book on Iraq’s future by
Iraqis of knowledge and expertise is its main strength,
it contains all revised papers and recommendations of
a seminar organized by the Centre for Arab Unity
Studies, one of the most prominent think tank in the
Arab World. The seminar was financed mostly by its
participants.
The plan and papers presented to the Seminar were
the outcome of various working groups entrusted by
the Center for Arab Unity Studies (CAUS) during
2005 to prepare such a plan for the post-liberated
Iraq. Papers presented at the seminar were of two
types: first, political and legal papers that define
legislative framework to the political system to be in-
stalled in the liberated Iraq; second, policy-oriented
academic researches that dealt with political, eco-
nomic and military issues related to the Iraqi State
and society, and its post-occupation future. The first
group of papers presented a «Draft Constitution of the
Republic of Iraq Post-Liberation»; Draft Law of
Political Parties and Draft Law of General Election;
and Draft Law of a High Commission for Election.
The second dealt with the Reconstruction of the Post-
Liberation Iraq, the Oil Industry and Policy; the
Rebuilding of the Iraqi Army; Media; Reparations
Imposed on Iraq by the Security Council and their
Impact; and the Kurdish Question. These papers, of
both types, were debated in detail at the seminar by ad
hoc committees, as well as at plenary sessions. The
objective was, in both cases, providing basic constitu-
tional and legal documents to rely on as guide-lines for
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the reconstruction of the Iraqi State and its political
system, both destroyed by the U.S. invasion and
occupation, and to reestablish both institutions on
foundations of democracy. All in all these presenta-
tions aimed at providing Iraqis with a vision of the
future, and an agenda for the rebuilding of their
country. The book also includes the full text of a
proposal for an American exit strategy launched in,
the form of an initiative in consultation with active
Iraqi political forces opposing occupation. It is a
«Road Map» for the liberation of Iraq (Haseeb, 2006,
p. 229).
The literature reviewed above on the post-Saddam
political system deals largely with the role of the
United States and the coalition forces in establishing
and stabilizing the country’s political system and its
proper functioning. However, works referring to the
institutions, processes and procedures of the political
system are very few. There are occasional references to
Iraqi politics, but there are no many in-depth studies
providing an analysis of the nature of the political
system and its expected outcomes. The few works in
the area do not differentiate between the three domi-
nant ethnic groups and their concerns vis-à-vis the
country’s internal organization and its future. Placing
them in the same box as is often done is tantamount
to equalizing centrifugal and centripetal forces, ignor-
ing current history and obstructions created by
colonial power.
Furthermore, the existing literature did not give
much space to the domestic political elites and their
interaction in running the affairs of the political
system. Consequently, many pertinent questions
relating to the government and politics of Iraq have
remained unanswered. This study will attempt to fill
in the gap in the literature and thus provide a compre-
hensive picture of the workings of the political system
in the post-Saddam era.
